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Abstract
The problem of scheduling unrelated machines by a truthful mechanism to minimize the makespan
was introduced in the seminal “Algorithmic Mechanism Design” paper by Nisan and Ronen. Nisan
and Ronen showed that there is a truthful mechanism that provides an approximation ratio of
min(m,n), where n is the number of machines and m is the number of jobs. They also proved
that no truthful mechanism can provide an approximation ratio better than 2. Since then, the
lower bound was improved to 1 +
√
2 ≈ 2.41 by Christodoulou, Kotsoupias, and Vidali, and then to
1 + φ ≈ 2.618 by Kotsoupias and Vidali. Very recently, the lower bound was improved to 2.755 by
Giannakopoulos, Hammerl, and Pocas. In this paper we further improve the bound to 2.8019.
Note that a gap between the upper bound and the lower bounds exists even when the number
of machines and jobs is very small. In particular, the known 1 +
√
2 lower bound requires at least 3
machines and 5 jobs. In contrast, we show a lower bound of 2.2055 that uses only 3 machines and 3
jobs and a lower bound of 1+
√
2 that uses only 3 machines and 4 jobs. For the case of two machines
and two jobs we show a lower bound of 2. Similar bounds for two machines and two jobs were known
before but only via complex proofs that characterized all truthful mechanisms that provide a finite
approximation ratio in this setting, whereas our new proof uses a simple and direct approach.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of scheduling unrelated machines to minimize the makespan by a truthful
mechanism. In this problem we have n machines and m jobs. Denote by tji the time it takes machine i
to process job j. The tji ’s are the private information of machine i. The goal is to minimize the makespan
by a truthful mechanism, that is, find an allocation (x1, . . . , xn) of all jobs such that maxi
∑
j∈xi
t
j
i is
minimized.
The problem was introduced by Nisan and Ronen in their seminal “Algorithmic Mechanism Design”
paper [16]. Nisan and Ronen showed that the VCG mechanism provides an approximation ratio of
min(m,n). They also proved a lower bound of 2 on the approximation ratio. Closing this gap is a
major open question that has attracted much attention.
The first improvement over these bounds was obtained by Christodoulou, Kotsoupias, and Vidali
[6] who improved the bound to 1 +
√
2 ≈ 2.41. Kotsoupias and Vidali [10] further improved the bound
to 1 + φ ≈ 2.618. No improvement over this bound was obtained for more than a decade until very
recently when Giannakopoulos, Hammerl, and Pocas [9] were able to improve the bound to 2.755.
The gap between the lower and upper bounds is obviously still very large. Evidence that the
“correct” answer is a lower bound of n was provided by Ashlagi et al. [1] who showed that no truthful
anonymous mechanism can guarantee an approximation ratio better than n.
Generalizations of this problem were also studied. In particular, when the valuations are submodular
(and not just additive), Christodoulou, Kotsoupias, and Kovacs obtain a lower bound of Ω(
√
n) [5].
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Many papers also considered randomized and fractional versions of the problem [16, 15, 17, 14, 13, 12,
3, 11, 4].
The main result of this paper is an improvement of the lower bound to 2.8019. We achieve this
bound by carefully refining the constructions of [10, 9]. This result is provided in Section 3.
We then go on by considering instances with small numbers of jobs and machines. Note that the
VCG mechanism and slight modifications of it are the only mechanisms that we know that provide
a finite approximation ratio. In fact, mechanisms that achieve non-trivial approximation guarantees
are unknown even for very small instances. For example, the 1 +
√
2 lower bound of [6] requires three
machines and five jobs. Currently, we do not even know whether there are mechanisms that provide
an approximation ratio better than 3 for instances with only three jobs and three machines.
In this paper we make progress in understanding the power of truthful mechanisms for small in-
stances. We show a lower bound of 2.2055 for instances with only 3 machines and 3 jobs (Section
4.2). In Section 4.3 we also provide a lower bound of 1 +
√
2 that uses only 3 machines and 4 jobs
(this matches the lower bound of [6] that achieves the same bound with 3 machines and 5 jobs). We
also consider instances with two machines and two jobs and show a lower bound of 2 (Section 4.1).
Similar bounds for two machines and two jobs were known before [8, 7] but only via complex proofs
that characterized all truthful mechanisms that provide a finite approximation ratio in this setting,
whereas our new proof uses a simple and direct approach which is much more in line with all other
lower bounds.
2 Preliminaries
There are n machines, m tasks. Denote by tji the time it takes machine i to process job j. The cost of
machine i, denoted by ti = (t
1
i , ...t
m
i ), is its private information. A time-processing matrix T ∈ Rn×m is
a matrix where the i’th row is ti. Let x = (x1, ..., xn) denote an allocation of tasks to machines, where
xi is the set of tasks allocated to machine i and x
j
i equal 1 if machine i gets job j in x and 0 otherwise.
A valid allocation allocates each task to exactly one machine. Let A be the set of all valid allocations.
We are interested in truthful mechanisms, which are mechanisms where the dominant strategy of each
agent (machine) is to reveal his true type ti. A truthful mechanism is a tuple M = (f, P ) that consists
of an allocation function f : Rn×m → A and a payment scheme p : Rn×m → Rn. The objective is
to minimize the makespan, which is given by maxi∈[n]Σj∈xit
j
i . Each machine is controlled by a selfish
agent whose goal is to maximize his utility function: ui(x, p) = pi − Σj∈xitji (the mechanism pays the
agents in order to incentivize them to perform the tasks).
A known characterization of a truthful mechanism is that its social choice function is weakly-
monotone [2]. In the setting of unrelated machine scheduling a mechanism is truthful if and only if
it has a weakly-monotone allocation algorithm. An allocation algorithm f : Rn×m → A is weakly
monotone if for every agent i, every t−i and every T = (ti, t−i), T
′ = (t′i, t−i) it holds that:∑
j∈[m]
(ti
j − t′ij) · (xij − x′ij) ≤ 0
where x = f(T ), x′ = f(T ′).
We will use ∞ to denote very large values, and ε to denote values that are as small as we wish. A
dummy job for player i is a job which takes player i some finite time to execute, while for all the other
players it takes infinite time. That is, every mechanism which achieves a finite approximation must
allocate this job to player i.
Several properties which follow from the weak monotonicity characterization are given in the lemmas
below. After each lemma we provide an example to illustrate it. Similar lemmas are standard in the
related literature.
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Lemma 2.1 Let M be a truthful mechanism with an allocation function f , and let T, T ′ ∈ Rn×m be
time-processing matrices that differ only on player i, i.e., T−i = T
′
−i and x = f(T ), x
′ = f(T ′). Let
B1 = {j |xji = 1 ∧ tij > t′ij}, B2 = {k |xki = 0 ∧ tik < t′ik}, and B3 = [m] \ (B1 ∪B2). Suppose that for
every q ∈ B3, it holds that tqi = t′qi . Then, for every r ∈ (B1 ∪B2), it holds that xri = x′ri .
Proof: By weak monotonicity:
0 ≥
∑
p∈[m]
(ti
p − t′ip) · (xip−x′ip)
=
∑
j∈B1
(ti
j − t′ij) · (xij − x′ij) +
∑
k∈B2
(ti
k − t′ik) · (xik − x′ik)
=
∑
j∈B1
(ti
j − t′ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· (1− x′ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
∑
k∈B2
(ti
k − t′ik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· (0− x′ik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
In order for the weak monotonicity inequality to hold, each term in the summation must be equal to
0, i.e., for every job r such that r ∈ (B1 ∪ B2), it holds that x′ir = xir , and for any other job k ∈ B3,
x′ik = 0.
When using Lemma 2.1, if not stated otherwise, B1 will be the set of all the jobs that the i’th player
gets in x and B2 will be the of all the jobs he does not get in x.
Example 2.2 (an example of Lemma 2.1) Consider the instances G1 with the allocation indicated
by stars and the instance G2 (given below). Applying Lemma 2.1 on this instances where T = G1, T
′ =
G2, i = 2, B1 = {3}, B2 = {1} and B3 = {2} gives us that in the instance G2 the second player gets
the third job but not the first one. (
1∗ 2 3
2 1∗ 3∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=G1
−→
(
1∗ 2 3
3 1 2∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=G2
Lemma 2.3 Let M be a truthful mechanism with a social choice function f , let T, T ′ ∈ Rn×m be time-
processing matrices that differ only on player i, i.e., T−i = T
′
−i, and let x = f(T ), x
′ = f(T ′). Let j be
a job that player i gets in x where ti
j > t′i
j , and let k be another job such that ti
k > t′i
k. Suppose that
for any other job l, it holds that ti
l = t′i
l . Then, it follows that either x′i
j = 1 or x′i
k = 1 or both.
Proof: By weak monotonicity:
0 ≥
∑
r∈[m]
(ti
r − t′ir) · (xir−x′ir)
= (ti
j − t′ij) · (xij−x′ij) + (tik − t′ik) · (xik−x′ik)
= (ti
j − t′ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·(1−x′ij) + (tik − t′ik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·(xik−x′ik)
Suppose not. Then, x′i
j = x′i
k = 0, and we have that:∑
r∈[m]
(ti
r − t′ir) · (xir−x′ir)
= (ti
j − t′ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+(ti
k − t′ik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·(xik)
and so the inequality does not hold, therefore either x′i
j = 1 or x′i
k = 1.
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Example 2.4 (an example of Lemma 2.3) Consider the instances H1 with the allocation indicated
by stars and the instance H2 (given below). Applying Lemma 2.3 on this instances where T = H1, T
′ =
H2, i = 2, j = 2 and k = 1 gives us that in the instance H2 the second player gets at least one of the
first two jobs. (
1∗ 2 3
2 1∗ 3∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H1
−→
(
1 2 3
1 0 3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H2
Lemma 2.5 Let M be a truthful mechanism with a finite approximation ratio, its social choice function
is denoted by f . Let i be a player with a dummy job j, let T, T ′ ∈ Rn×m be time-processing matrices
that differ only on player i, i.e., T−i = T
′
−i, and let x = f(T ). Let B1 = {r 6= j |xri = 1 ∧ tir > t′ir},
B2 = {k |xki = 0 ∧ tik < t′ik}, and B3 = [m] \ (B1 ∪ B2 ∪ {j}). Suppose that for every q ∈ B3, it holds
that tqi = t
′q
i . Then for p ∈ (B1 ∪B2 ∪ {j}), it holds that xpi = x′pi , where x′ = f(T ′).
Proof: Observe that if the mechanism has a finite approximation ratio then it must allocate job j to
player i. Thus, we have that xi
j = 1 and x′i
j = 1 . By weak monotonicity:
0 ≥
∑
s∈[m]
(ti
s − t′is) · (xis−x′is)
=
∑
r∈B1
(ti
r − t′ir) · (xir − x′ir) +
∑
k∈B2
(ti
k − t′ik) · (xik − x′ik) + (tij − t′ij) · (xij − x′ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
=
∑
r∈B1
(ti
r − t′ir)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· (1 − x′ir)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+
∑
k∈B2
(ti
k − t′ik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
· (0− x′ik)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
and for the inequality to hold it must be that for every r ∈ B1, it holds that xri = x′ri = 1 and for every
k ∈ B2, it holds that xki = x′ki = 0. As explained before, since the mechanism has a finite approximation
ratio it must be that xi
j = x′i
j = 1.
When using Lemma 2.5, if not stated otherwise, B1 will be the set of all the jobs that the i’th player
gets in x and B2 will be the of all the jobs he does not get in x.
Example 2.6 (an example of Lemma 2.5) Consider the instance I1 with the allocation indicated
by stars and the instance I2 (given below). Applying Lemma 2.5 on this instances where T = I1, T
′ =
I2, i = 2, j = 4, B1 = {3}, B2 = {1} and B3 = {2} gives us that in instance I2 the second player gets
the third and forth jobs but not the first job.
(
1∗ 1∗ 2 ∞
1 2 1∗ 1∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I1
−→
(
1∗ 1∗ 2 ∞
2 2 12
∗
3∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=I2
Lemma 2.7 Let M be a truthful mechanism with a social choice function f , let T, T ′ ∈ Rn×m be
time-processing matrices that differ only on player i, i.e., T−i = T
′
−i, and let x = f(T ), x
′ = f(T ′). Let
j1, j2 be two jobs such that xi
j1 = xi
j2 = 1, ti
j1 > t′i
j1 and ti
j2 < t′i
j2 . Suppose that for any other job
j 6= j1, j2, it holds that tij = t′ij. Then, if x′ij2 = 1, then also x′ij1 = 1.
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Proof: Assume that x′i
j2 = 1. By weak monotonicity:
0 ≥
∑
s∈[m]
(ti
s − t′is) · (xis−x′is)
= (ti
j1 − t′ij1) · (xij1 − x′ij1) + (tij2 − t′ij2) · (xij2 − x′ij2)
= (ti
j1 − t′ij1) · (1− x′ij1) + (tij2 − t′ij2) · (1− 1)
= (ti
j1 − t′ij1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
· (1− x′ij1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
In order for the inequality to hold it must be the case that x′i
j1 = 1.
Example 2.8 (an example of Lemma 2.7) Consider the instances K1 with the allocation indicated
by stars and the instance I2 (given below). Applying Lemma 2.7 on this instances where T = K1, T
′ =
K2, i = 2, j1 = 1 and j2 = 2 gives us that in the instance K2 if the second player gets the second job
then he must also get the first job.
(
1 2 3∗
1∗ 0∗ 3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=K1
−→
(
1 2 3
3
4 1 3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=K2
When applying lemmas 2.1, 2.3, 2.5, 2.7 we will often increase or decrease only some of the costs,
and not all of them, in order to make the proof clearer. The convention will be that the other values
are increased or decreased by a small amount, as was done in [10].
When visualizing instances using matrices, a blue star (*) will be used to indicate the allocation
of the mechanism M in this instance, and a red at (@) will be used to indicate an optimal allocation
in this instance. Moreover, note that sometimes the allocation of the mechanism M will be partial
(namely, some jobs will not be visually assigned a player, since which player gets the job is irrelevant).
3 A Lower Bound of ≈ 2.8019
Theorem 3.1 There is a sequence of numbers {ai}∞i=1, where an −−−→n→∞ 1.8019 and for each i, ai > 1,
such that for every n, every truthful mechanism for n+ 2 machines and 2 · (n + 2) jobs guarantees an
approximation ratio no better than 1 + an.
In the proof of the theorem we will write a instead of an to simplify notation. For every n, let An
be the following instance:
An =


∞ 1 1 1
a2
1
a3
. . . 1
an
0 ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞
1 ε ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
1 ∞ ε ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a
∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a2
. . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . 1
an−1
∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞ 0


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Fix a mechanism M with an approximation ratio better than 1 + a. In the instance An, M must
allocate the first job to either the second player or the third. We analyze the case where M allocates
the first job to the second player. The analysis is similar if the job is instead allocated to the third
player.
Lemma 3.2 In the instance An, M allocates the first two jobs to the second player.
Proof: Suppose that the second player is assigned the first job but not the second one. Consider the
second player. Decrease his cost for the first job to 0, and increase his cost for the second job by ε. By
Lemma 2.1, the second player will not get the second job. Thus, the first player will (otherwise, if some
other player gets the second job, the approximation ratio will be infinite). Increase the first player’s
cost for his dummy job to 1
a
. By Lemma 2.5 we have that the first player keeps both the second job
and his dummy job (as shown in Figure 1). In this case the makespan of the mechanism M is 1 + 1
a
whereas the optimal makespan is 1
a
. This results in an approximation ratio of 1 + a.


∞ 1∗ 1 1
a2
1
a3
. . . 1
an
1
a
∗@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞
0∗@ 2 · ε@ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
1 ∞ ε@ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a
@ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a2
@
. . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . 1
an−1
@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞ 0@


Figure 1: This instance is the result of the trasitions described in Lemma 3.2. Recall that M ’s partial
allocation is indicated by * and the optimal allocation by @.
By Lemma 3.2, we can assume that the second player gets the second job in addition to the first
job in An. Increase the cost of the second player for the second job from ε to 1 and decrease his cost
for the first job by ε. Denote this instance by Bn.
Bn =


∞ 1 1 1
a2
1
a3
. . . 1
an
0 ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞
1 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
1 ∞ ε ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a
∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a2
. . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . 1
an−1
∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞ 0


We divide the analysis to different cases based on the player that gets the second job in Bn. There
are two possible cases. In the first case, M allocates the second job to the second player. In the second
case, M allocates the second job to the first player. Observe that if M allocates the second job to any
other player then it will have an approximation ratio worse than 1 + a (the cost of the other players
for the second job is ∞).
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Case 1: The Second Player Keeps Job 2
In this case, M allocates the second job to the second player in Bn. Recall that in the instance An, M
allocates the first two jobs to the second player. By Lemma 2.7 for i = 2, j1 = 1, j2 = 2, we have that
the second player gets the first job in addition to our assumption that he gets the second job in Bn.
We increase the second player’s cost for his dummy job to 1, and by applying Lemma 2.5 we have that
the second player keeps the first two jobs, and his dummy job. This results in M having a makespan
of 3 whereas the optimal makespan is 1 (see Figure 2). The optimal makespan can be achieved when
the third player gets the first and third jobs, the first player gets the second job, the i’th player for
4 ≤ i ≤ n + 2 gets the i’th job and every player gets his dummy job. Thus, the mechanism has an
approximation ratio of 3.


∞ 1@ 1 1
a2
1
a3
. . . 1
an
0@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞
1∗ 1∗ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ∞ 1∗@ . . . . . . . . . ...
1@ ∞ ε ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a
@ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a2
@
. . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . 1
an−1
@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞ 0@


Figure 2: In Case 1 we get this instance by increasing the second player’s dummy job’s cost to 1.
Case 2: The First Player Takes Job 2
In this case, in the instance Bn the second job was allocated to the first player. Reduce the first player’s
cost for the first two jobs to 1
a
and denote the resulting instance by Cn.
Cn =


1
a
1
a
1 1
a2
1
a3
. . . 1
an
0 ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞
1 1 ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
1 ∞ ε ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a
∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a2
. . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . 1
an−1
∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞ 0


By Lemma 2.3 for j = 2, k = 1, we have that the first player gets at least one of the first two jobs
in Cn. We analyze the case that the first player gets the first job (and possibly others). If the first
player gets the second job the analysis is similar.
Let C = {1, 2, 4, ..., n + 2} be the set of the first n + 2 tasks, except the third one. We divide the
analysis to three cases based on the allocation of the mechanism M in the instance Cn. In the first
case, the first player gets the first job in Cn but not the second job. In the second case, the first player
gets the first two jobs, but not some other job j for 4 ≥ j ∈ C. In the third case, the first player gets
all the jobs in C. In each case we will show that M has an approximation ratio of at least 1 + a.
The analysis of all these cases is similar to the previous proofs of Koutsoupias and Vidali [10] and
Giannakopoulos et al. [9].
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Case 2.1
In this case, M allocates the first job to the second player but not the second job. We decrease the
first player’s cost for the first job to 0. By Lemma 2.1, the first player will still not get the second job,
and since M has a finite approximation ratio, the second player will. Increase the second player’s cost
for his dummy job to 1
a
. By Lemma 2.5, the second player will get his dummy job in addition to the
second job (see Figure 3). The makespan of this allocation is 1 + 1
a
, whereas the optimal makespan is
1
a
(this can be achieved when the first player gets the first two jobs, the third player gets the third job,
the i’th player i for 4 ≤ i ≤ n + 2 gets the i’th job, and each player gets his dummy job). Thus, the
mechanism has an approximation ratio of 1 + a.


0∗@ 1
a
@
1 1
a2
1
a3
. . . 1
an
0@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞
1 1∗ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ∞ 1
a
∗@ . . .
. . .
. . .
...
1 ∞ ε@ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a
@ ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a2
@
. . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . 1
an−1
@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞ 0@


Figure 3: This instance is the result of the transitions in Lemma Case 2.1.
Case 2.2
In this case the first player gets the first two jobs but not some other job j for 4 ≥ j ∈ C. Denote by
i ≥ 4 the smallest index of a job from C that the first player does not get. Reduce the first player’s cost
for all jobs in C that he does get to 0 and increase by ε its cost for job i. By Lemma 2.1, we have that
the first player still doesn’t get the i’th job, and because M has an approximation ratio better than
1 + a, the i’th player gets the i’th job. Increase the i’th player’s cost for his dummy job to 1
ai−2
. By
Lemma 2.5, we have that the i’th player will keep the i’th job and his dummy job (see Figure 4). Now,
the mechanism’s makespan will be 1
ai−2
+ 1
ai−3
whereas the optimal makespan is 1
ai−2
. The optimal
makespan can be achieved when allocating the third job to the third player, the k’th job for i ≥ k ∈ C
to the first player, the r’th job for i < r ∈ C to the r’th player, and each dummy job to its respective
player. Hence, the mechanism has an approximation ratio of 1 + a.


0∗@ 0∗@ 1 0∗@ . . . 1
ai−2
@
. . . 1
an
0@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ∞
1 1 ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ . . . ∞ ∞ 0@ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
1 ∞ ε@ ∞ . . . ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a
. . . ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ai−3
∗
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . . 1
ai−2
@∗ . . .
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
an−1
@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ∞ 0@


Figure 4: This instance is the result of the transitions in Case 2.2.
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Case 2.3
In this case, the first player gets all the jobs in C. We will increase the first player’s dummy job’s
cost to 1 and by Lemma 2.5, we will get that the first player keeps all of his jobs (see Figure 5).
The optimal makespan is 1 which can be achieved in the case where each player gets his dummy job,
the second player gets the second job , the third player gets the first and third jobs, and the j’th
player for 4 ≤ j ≤ n + 2 gets the j’th job. Thus, the mechanism will have an approximation ratio of
1 + 2
a
+ 1
a2
+ ...+ 1
an
.


1
a
∗ 1
a
∗
1 1
a2
∗
. . . 1
ak
∗
. . . 1
an
∗
1∗@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ∞
1 1@ ∞ ∞ . . . ∞ . . . ∞ ∞ 0@ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
1@ ∞ ε@ ∞ . . . ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ 1
a
@
. . . ∞ . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ . . . . . . . . . ∞ ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ak−1
@
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . .
...
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
an−1
@ ∞ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ∞ 0@


Figure 5: This is the instance that results from the transition described in Case 2.3.
Concluding the Proof
We finish the proof of Theorem 1 by choosing a such that 1+ 2
a
+ 1
a2
+ ...+ 1
an
= 1+ 1
a
+
1
a
(n+1)
− 1
a
1
a
−1
= 1+a.
When the number of players is n + 2 for n ≥ 1 we have that the approximation ratio is 1 + a where
a satisfies the equation 1
a
+
1
a
(n+1)
− 1
a
1
a
−1
= a. For example, when the number of players is 5 we get a
lower bound of 2.7106, and when the numbers of players is 7 we get a lower bound of 2.7704. When n
approaches infinity we have that 1
a
+
1
a
(n+1)
−
1
a
1
a
−1
= 1
a
+ 1
a−1 , and so a =
1
a
+ 1
a−1 . That is, a ≈ 1.8019 and
the approximation ratio is 2.8019 (see Table 1).
n 3 4 ... 7 8 ... ∞
approximation ratio 1 +
√
2 1 + φ 2.770 2.788 2.8019
Table 1: The lower bound of the approximation ratio by the number of players n.
4 Lower Bounds For Small Instances
Throughout this section we denote by ε+, ε−, ε−−, ε−−− values that are as small as we wish, such that
ε+ >> ε− >> ε−− >> ε−−−. Thus, we will treat ε
+
ε−
, ε
−
ε−−
, ε
−−
ε−−−
as ∞.
4.1 2 Players and 2 Jobs
Theorem 4.1 Every truthful mechanism for the unrelated machine scheduling problem with two ma-
chines and two jobs has an approximation ratio of at least 2.
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Let M be a truthful mechanism for the 2 × 2 case of the unrelated machine scheduling problem
with an approximation ratio better than 2. Consider the instance:
D =
(
1 ε−
1 ε+
)
Lemma 4.2 If M has a finite approximation ratio then it must allocate the second job to the first
player.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that M has a finite approximation ratio and it allocates the second
job to the second player. Then, there are two possible cases. In the first case, M allocates the first job
to the first player, and in the second case, M allocates the first job to the second player in addition to
the second job.
In the first case, reduce the first player’s cost for the first job to 0. By Lemma 2.1, M allocates the
same jobs to the first player i.e., the first player will get job 1 and player 2 will get job 2 (see Figure 6).
In this case the mechanism’s makespan is ε+ whereas the optimal makespan is ε− (this can be achieved
when the first player gets both jobs). Thus, M has an approximation ratio of ε
+
ε−
which is as large as
we want. (
0∗@ ε−
@
1 ε+
∗
)
Figure 6: This is the instance that result from the transition described in Lemma 4.2, Case 1.
In the second case, M allocates both jobs to the second player. Reduce the cost of the second
player for the first job to 0. By Lemma 2.1, we have that the second player keeps both jobs. Thus,
M has a makespan of ε+ whereas the optimal makespan is ε− (see Figure 7). In this case, M has an
approximation ratio which can be made arbitrarily large.
(
1 ε−
@
0∗@ ε+
∗
)
Figure 7: This is the instance that result from the transition described in Lemma 4.2, Case 2.
By Lemma 4.2, we have that M allocates the second job to the first player. There are two possible
cases: the first is that the first player gets the first job and the second is that the second player gets
the first job.
Case 1: M Allocates Job 1 to Player 1
In this case, in the instance D, M allocates both jobs to the first player. Increase the second player’s
cost for the second job to ∞. This effectively makes the second job a dummy job for player 1. By
Lemma 2.1, the second player’s allocation does not change. Thus, the first player keeps both jobs.
Increase the cost of the first player for the second job to 1. By Lemma 2.5, the first player keeps both
jobs and M has a makespan of 2 whereas the optimal makespan is 1 (this can be achieved when the
first player gets the second job and the second player gets the first job) (see Figure 8).
Case 2: M Allocates Job 1 to the Second Player
In this case we reduce the second player’s cost for the second job to ε−− and reduce its cost for the
first job by ε′ > ε+ − ε−−. Denote this instance by D1 (see Figure 9).
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(
1∗ ε−
∗
1 ε+
)
−→
(
1∗ ε−
∗
1 ∞
)
−→
(
1∗ 1∗@
1@ ∞
)
Figure 8: The transitions described in the analysis of the first case of the proof of theorem 2.
(
1 ε−
1− ε′ ε−−
)
Figure 9: The instance D1
Lemma 4.3 In the instance D1, M must allocate the first job to the second player.
Proof: Consider the weak monotonicity inequality applied on the second player where x′ is the
allocation of M in the instance D1 and assume by contradiction that x
′
2
1 = 0:
(1− (1− ε′)) · (1− x′21) + (ε+ − ε−−) · (0− x22)
= (ε′) + (ε+ − ε−−) · (0− x22)
≤ 0
In this case the inequality does not hold since ε′ > ε+ − ε−−.
By Lemma 4.3, we have that in D1 the second player gets the first job. Similarly to Lemma 4.2,
we can show that M allocates the second job to the second player in D1 (otherwise we can decrease
the second player’s cost for the first job to 0. Using Lemma 2.1, we get that M has an approximation
ratio of ε
−
ε−−
which is as large as we want).
It remains to show that in D1, if the second player gets both jobs then M has an approximation
ratio of 2. In this case, increase the first player’s cost for the second job to ∞. By Lemma 2.1, the first
player will not get either job. Thus, the second player will keep both jobs and the makespan of M will
be 2− ε′, whereas the optimal makespan is 1 (this can be achieved when the first player gets the first
job and the second player gets the second job). See Figure 10.
(
1 ε−
(1− ε′)∗ ε−−∗
)
−→
(
1 ∞
(1− ε′)∗ ε−−∗
)
−→
(
1@ ∞
(1− ε′)∗ 1∗@
)
Figure 10: The transitions described in the case that in D1 the second player gets both jobs (as analyzed
in the second case of the proof of theorem 2).
4.2 3 Players and 3 Jobs
Theorem 4.4 Every truthful mechanism for the unrelated machine scheduling with three machines and
three jobs has an approximation ratio of at least 2.2055
Let M be a truthful mechanism for the 3 × 3 case of the unrelated machine scheduling problem
with an approximation ratio better than 2.2055. Consider the instance:
E =

∞ c ε
+
b ∞ ∞
a b ε−


We will show that M has an approximation ratio of at least min{1 + c
b
, b
a
, a+b+c
c
} where a < b < c.
We can then prove Theorem 4.4 by choosing a = 1, b ≈ 2.2055 and c ≈ 2.6589.
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We divide the analysis to four cases based on the allocation ofM in E. In the first case, M allocates
the second job to the first player. In the second, M allocates the first job to the second player and the
second job to the third player. In the third case, M allocates the first three jobs to the third player. In
the forth case, M allocates the first two jobs to the third player and the third job to the first player.
Case 1: M Allocates the Second Job to the First Player
There are two possible cases for the allocation of the third job in E. In the first case, M allocates the
third job to the first player and in the second case, M allocates it to the third player (otherwise the
approximation ratio can be made arbitrarily large).
Case 1.1: M Allocates the Third Job to the First Player
In this case, in the instance E, M allocates the second and third jobs to the first player. Increase the
third player’s cost for the third job to ∞ which makes the third job a dummy job for the first player.
By Lemma 2.1 we have that the third player does not get the second and third jobs. Thus, sinceM has
a finite approximation ratio, the first player keeps these jobs. Increase the cost of the the first player
for his dummy job to b. By Lemma 2.5, the first player gets the second and third jobs which results in
an approximation ratio of c+b
b
, as is visualized below.

∞ c
∗ ε+
∗
b ∞ ∞
a b ε−

 −→

∞ c
∗ ε+
∗
b ∞ ∞
a b ∞

 −→

∞ c
∗ b∗@
b@ ∞ ∞
a b@ ∞


Case 1.2: M does not Allocate the Third Job to the First Player
In this case, in E, M allocates the second job but not the third job to the first player. Reduce the first
player’s cost for the third job to ε−− and reduce his cost for the second job by ε′ > ε+ − ε−−. Denote
this instance by E1 (as is visualized below).
∞ c
∗ ε+
b ∞ ∞
a b ε−
∗

 −→

∞ c− ε
′ ε−−
b ∞ ∞
a b ε−


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E1
Lemma 4.5 Suppose that in E, M allocates the second job, but not the third job, to the first player.
Then, in E1, M allocates the second job to the first player.
Proof: Consider the weak monotonicity inequality applied on the first player where x′ is the allocation
of M in E1 and x is the allocation of M in E. Assume by contradiction that x
′
1
2 = 0:
(∞−∞) · (0− x11) + (c− (c− ε′)) · (1− x′12) + (ε+ − ε−−) · (0− x′13)
= (ε′) + (ε+ − ε−−) · (0− x′13)
≤ 0
and we arrive at a contradiction, since ε′ > ε+ − ε−−.
By Lemma 4.5, in E1, M allocates the second job to the first player. There are two possible cases
in the instance E1: the first is that M allocates the third job to the third player. The second case is
that M allocates the third job to the first player.
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Case 1.2.1
In this case, in E1, M allocates the third job to the third player and the second job to the first player.
Reduce the cost of the first player for the second job to 0, and by Lemma 2.1, the first player still gets
only the second job (as visualized below).

∞ c− ε
′∗ ε−−
b ∞ ∞
a b ε−
∗

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ 0
∗ ε−−
b ∞ ∞
a b ε−
∗


There are again two possible cases. In the first, the second player is assigned the first job, which
results in an approximation ratio of b
a
(the makespan of M is b whereas the optimal one is a which can
be achieved, for example, when the first player takes the second and third jobs and the third player
takes the first job).

∞ 0∗@ ε−−
@
b∗ ∞ ∞
a@ b ε−
∗


In the second case, the third player takes the first and third jobs and the first player takes the second
job. Reduce the third player’s cost for the first job to 0, and by Lemma 2.1, we have that the third
player will still get the first and third jobs. Then, M has a makespan of ε− whereas the optimal one
is ε−− (this can be achieved when the first player gets the second and third jobs and the third player
gets the first job) which results in an approximation ratio of ε
−
ε−−
, which can be made arbitrarily large.

∞ 0
∗ ε−−
b ∞ ∞
a∗ b ε−
∗

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ 0∗@ ε−−
@
b ∞ ∞
0∗@ b ε−
∗


Case 1.2.2
In this case, in E1, M allocates the second and third jobs to the first player.
∞ c− ε
′∗ ε−−
∗
b ∞ ∞
a b ε−


The analysis is very similar to Case 1.1. Increase the third player’s cost for the third job to ∞,
which makes the third job a dummy job for the first player. By Lemma 2.1, we have that the third
player does not get the second or the third jobs. Thus, since M has a finite approximation ratio the
first player keeps these jobs. Increase the first player’s dummy job’s cost to b. By Lemma 2.5, the first
player gets the second and third jobs which results in an approximation ratio of c+b
b
. This is visualized
below.

∞ c− ε
′∗ ε−−
∗
b ∞ ∞
a b ε−

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ c− ε
′∗ ε−−
∗
b ∞ ∞
a b ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

∞ c− ε
′∗ b∗@
b@ ∞ ∞
a b@ ∞


Case 2: M Allocates the First Job to the Second Player and the Second Job to the Third
Player
In this case, M allocates the first job to the second player and the second job to the third player in E.
Reduce the cost of the third player for the second job to 0. By Lemma 2.1, the third player will not
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get the first job and since M has a finite approximation ratio, the second player will get it. Then, M
will have an approximation ratio of b
a
. This is visualized below.

∞ c ε
+
b∗ ∞ ∞
a b∗ ε−

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ c ε
+
b∗ ∞ ∞
a@ 0∗@ ε−
@


Case 3: M Allocates All Three Jobs to the Third Player
In this case, M allocates all three jobs to the third player. Increase the cost of the first player for the
third job to ∞. This makes the third job a dummy job for the first player. By Lemma 2.1, the first
player will not get any job. Denote the resulting instance by E2.
∞ c ε
+
b ∞ ∞
a∗ b∗ ε−
∗

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ c ∞b ∞ ∞
a b∗ ε−
∗


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E2
There are two possible cases based on the allocation of M in the instance E2. In the first case, M
allocates the first job to the second player and in the second case, M allocates the first job to the third
player.
Case 3.1
In this case, M allocates the first job to the second player and allocates the second and third jobs to
the third player in the instance E2. Reduce the third player cost for the second job to 0 and by Lemma
2.1, the third player will not get the first job. Thus, since M has a finite approximation ratio, the
second player will get the first job which results in an approximation ratio of b
a
. This is shown below.

∞ c ∞b∗ ∞ ∞
a b∗ ε−
∗

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ c ∞b∗ ∞ ∞
a@ 0∗@ ε−
∗@


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E2
Case 3.2
In this case, M allocates all three jobs to the third player in the instance E2. Increase the cost of the
third player for its dummy job (the third job) to c and by Lemma 2.5, the third player will get all three
jobs. In this case M has an approximation ratio of a+b+c
c
, as depicted below.

∞ c ∞b ∞ ∞
a∗ b∗ ε−
∗

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

∞ c
@ ∞
b@ ∞ ∞
a∗ b∗ c∗@


Case 4: M Allocates the First Two Jobs to the Third Player and the Third job to the
First Player
Reduce the third player’s cost for the first two jobs to 0. By Lemma 2.1, the third player will not get
the third job and since the approximation is finite the third player will. In this case, M has a makespan
of ε+ whereas the optimal makespan is of ε− which results in an approximation ratio of ε
+
ε−
which can
be arbitrarily large.
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
∞ c ε
+∗
b ∞ ∞
a∗ b∗ ε−

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ c ε
+∗
b ∞ ∞
0∗@ 0∗@ ε−
@


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=E2
4.3 3 Players and 4 Jobs
Theorem 4.6 Every truthful mechanism for the unrelated machine scheduling with three machines and
four jobs has an approximation ratio of at least 1 +
√
2.
Let M be a truthful mechanism for the 3 × 4 case of the unrelated machine scheduling problem
with an approximation ratio better than 1 +
√
2.
Consider the instance:
F =

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1 ε− ε− ∞
1 ε+ ε−− ∞


We will prove that M has an approximation ratio of at least min{1 + x, 2+x
x
} where x > 1. This
proves Theorem 4.6 when using x =
√
2.
Consider the instance F . We divide the analysis to cases based on the allocation of M . In the first
case, M allocates the second job to the first player. In the second case, M allocates the first two jobs
to the second player. In the third case, M allocates the first job to the second player and the second
job to the third player. In the fourth case, M allocates the first job to the third player and the second
job to the second player. In the fifth case, M allocates the first two jobs to the third player.
Case 1
In this case, in the instance F , M allocates the second job to the first player. Increase the first player’s
dummy job’s cost to 1 and by Lemma 2.5 we have that the first player keeps the second and forth jobs
which results in a makespan of 1 + x whereas the optimal makespan is 1.

∞ x
∗ ∞ ε−−−∗
1 ε− ε− ∞
1 ε+ ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5


∞ x∗ ∞ 1∗@
1@ ε−
@
ε− ∞
1 ε+ ε−−
@ ∞


Case 2
In this case, in the instance F , M allocates the first two jobs to the second player.

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1∗ ε−
∗
ε− ∞
1 ε+ ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1∗ ε− ε− ∞
1 ∞ ε−− ∞


By Lemma 2.1, the third player doesn’t get the first or the second jobs. In the case that the first player
gets the second job we have an 1 + x approximation ratio as shown below:

∞ x
∗ ∞ ε−−−∗
1∗ ε− ε− ∞
1 ∞ ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

∞ x
∗ ∞ 1∗@
1 ε−
@
ε−
@ ∞
1@ ∞ ε−− ∞


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Otherwise, the second player gets the first two jobs.

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1∗ ε−
∗
ε− ∞
1 ∞ ε−− ∞

 −→

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1 1 ε− ∞
1 ∞ ε−− ∞


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F1
There are two possible cases. In the first, the first player gets the second job in the instance F1 (this
is analyzed in Case 2.1). In he second case, the second player keeps the second job (this analyzed in
Case 2.2).
Case 2.1 
∞ x
∗ ∞ ε−−−
1 1 ε− ∞
1 ∞ ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

∞ x
∗ ∞ 1∗@
1 1@ ε−
@ ∞
1@ ∞ ε−− ∞


In this case, M has an approximation ratio of 1 + x.
Case 2.2
In this case, in the instance F , M allocates the first two jobs to the second player and in the instance
F1, M allocates the second job to the second player. By Lemma 2.7, for i = 2, j1 = 1, j2 = 2 we have
that in the instance F1 the second player gets the first two jobs.
There are two possible cases, in the first case the second player gets the first three jobs in F1
(analyzed in Case 2.2.1). In the second case the second player gets the first two jobs and the third
player gets the third job (analyzed in Case 2.2.2).
Case 2.2.1 
∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1∗ 1∗ ε−
∗ ∞
1 ∞ ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−@
0∗@ 0∗@ ε−
∗ ∞
1 ∞ ε−−@ ∞


This results in an approximation ratio of ε
−
ε−−
which can be made arbitrarily large.
Case 2.2.2
Let ε′ > ε− − ε−−−.
∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1∗ 1∗ ε− ∞
1 ∞ ε−−∗ ∞

 −→

 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1− ε′ 1− ε′ ε−−− ∞
1 ∞ ε−− ∞


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F2
Similarly to Lemma 4.5, it can be shown that the second player keeps the first two jobs in the instance
F2. There are two possible cases. In the first, the second player gets the first three jobs in the instance
F2 (analyzed in Case 2.2.2.1). In the second case the second player gets the first two jobs and the third
player gets the third job (analyzed in Case 2.2.2.2).
16
Case 2.2.2.1
 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1− ε′∗ 1− ε′∗ ε−−−∗ ∞
1 ∞ ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1− ε′∗ 1− ε′ ε−−−∗ ∞
1 ∞ ∞ ∞


By Lemma 2.1, the third player doesn’t get a job from the first three jobs. There are two possible
cases, the first is that the first player takes the second job (Case 2.2.2.1.1) and the second is that the
second player takes the second job (and jobs 1,3) (Case 2.2.2.1.2).
Case 2.2.2.1.1
 ∞ x
∗ ∞ ε−−−∗
1− ε′∗ 1− ε′ ε−−−∗ ∞
1 ∞ ∞ ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

 ∞ x
∗ ∞ 1∗@
1− ε′ 1− ε′@ ε−−−@ ∞
1@ ∞ ∞ ∞


In this case, M has an approximation ratio of 1 + x
Case 2.2.2.1.2
 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1− ε′∗ 1− ε′∗ ε−−−∗ ∞
1 ∞ ∞ ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

 ∞ x@ ∞ ε−−−
∗@
1− ε′∗ 1− ε′∗ x∗@ ∞
1@ ∞ ∞ ∞


In this case, M has an approximation ratio of 2+x
x
.
Case 2.2.2.2
 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1− ε′∗ 1− ε′∗ ε−−− ∞
1 ∞ ε−−∗ ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−@
0∗@ 0∗@ ε−−−
@ ∞
1 ∞ ε−−∗ ∞


By Lemma 2.1, the second player doesn’t get the third job and since M has a finite approximation
ratio the third job goes to the third player. This results in an approximation ratio of ε
−−
ε−−−
which can
be made arbitrarily large.
Case 3
In this case, M has an approximation ratio of ε+
ε−
which can be made arbitrarily large.

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1∗ ε− ε− ∞
1 ε+
∗
ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1


∞ x ∞ ε−−−@
0∗@ ε−
@
ε− ∞
1 ε+
∗
ε−−
@ ∞


Case 4
Let ε′ > ε+ − ε−− 
∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1 ε−
∗
ε− ∞
1∗ ε+ ε−− ∞

 −→

 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−
1 ε− ε− ∞
1− ε′∗ ε−− ε−− ∞


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F3
Similarly to Lemma 4.5, the third player gets the first job. There are three possible cases. In the
first, the first player gets the second job (Case 4.1), in the second case, the second player gets the
second job (Case 4.2) and in the third case the third player gets the second job (Case 4.3).
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Case 4.1
In this case, M has an approximation ratio of 1 + x.

 ∞ x
∗ ∞ ε−−−∗
1 ε− ε− ∞
1− ε′∗ ε−− ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

 ∞ x
∗ ∞ 1∗@
1@ ε− ε− ∞
1− ε′∗ ε−−@ ε−−@ ∞


Case 4.2
In this case, M has an approximation ratio which can be made arbitrarily large.

 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1 ε−
∗
ε− ∞
1− ε′∗ ε−− ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗@
1 ε−
∗
ε− ∞
0∗@ ε−−
@
ε−−
@ ∞


This results in an approximation ratio of ε
−
2·ε−−
or, x
2·ε−−
. The second approximation is achieved
when the first player gets the second job and not the second player (after the above transition).
Case 4.3
In this case there are two possible cases, the first is that the third job is allocated to the second player
(Case 4.3.1) and the second is that the third job is allocated to the third player(Case 4.3.2).
Case 4.3.1 
 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1 ε− ε−
∗ ∞
1− ε′∗ ε−−∗ ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗@
1 ε− ε−
∗ ∞
0∗@ 0∗@ ε−−
@ ∞


In this case, M has an approximation ratio of ε
−
ε−−
which can be made arbitrarily large.
Case 4.3.2 
 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1 ε− ε− ∞
1− ε′∗ ε−−∗ ε−−∗ ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1

 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1 ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′ ε−− ε−− ∞


︸ ︷︷ ︸
=F4
By Lemma 2.1, the second player does not get the first job. Thus, sinceM has a finite approximation
ratio, the third player gets it. There are two possible cases. The first is that the first player takes the
second job (Case 4.3.2.1) and the second case, that the third player does (Case 4.3.2.2).
Case 4.3.2.1
In this case, M has an approximation ratio of 1 + x.

 ∞ x
∗ ∞ ε−−−∗
1 ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′ ε−− ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

 ∞ x
∗ ∞ 1∗@
1 ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′@ ε−−@ ε−−@ ∞


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Case 4.3.2.2
 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1 ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′∗ ε−−∗ ε−−∗ ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

 ∞ x ∞ ε−−−
∗@
1 ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′ 1 ε−− ∞


By Lemma 2.7, If the third player gets the second job, he also gets the first job, this case is analyzed
in 4.3.2.2.1. Otherwise, the first player gets the second job, this is analyzed in 4.3.2.2.2.
Case 4.3.2.2.1
In this case, M has an approximation ratio of 2+x
x
.

 ∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1 ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′∗ 1∗ ε−−∗ ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

 ∞ x@ ∞ ε−−−
∗@
1@ ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′∗ 1∗ x∗@ ∞


Case 4.3.2.2.2
In this case, M has an approximation ratio of 1 + x.

 ∞ x
∗ ∞ ε−−−∗
1 ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′ 1 ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.5

 ∞ x
∗ ∞ 1∗@
1@ ∞ ∞ ∞
1− ε′ 1@ ε−−@ ∞


Case 5
In this case, M has an approximation ratio of ε
+
ε−
which can be made arbitrarily large.

∞ x ∞ ε
−−−∗
1 ε− ε− ∞
1∗ ε+
∗
ε−− ∞

 −→︸︷︷︸
By Lemma 2.1


∞ x ∞ ε−−−∗@
1 ε−
@
ε− ∞
0∗@ ε+
∗
ε−−
@ ∞


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